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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 44329 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) KOOTENAI COUNTY NO. CR 2016-779 
v.     ) 
     ) 
JEREMY MICHAEL GLEESE, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Jeremy Gleese contends the district court abused its discretion when it imposed 
and executed his sentence in this case, or alternatively, when it did not reduce that 
sentence pursuant to his I.C.R. 35 motion (hereinafter, Rule 35 motion).  In either case, 
he asserts the district court did not sufficiently consider the mitigating factors in the 
record.  Therefore, this Court should remand this case for a new sentencing 





Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Gleese pled guilty to burglary, and the State 
agreed to dismiss a persistent violator enhancement.  (R., p.37; Tr., Vol.1, p.7, 
L.22 - p.8, L.12.)1  Mr. Gleese explained that he had relapsed and begun using drugs 
again, and, during that time, he had gone into a Sears store to take some tools.  
(Tr., Vol.1, p.10, L.25 - p.11, L.4.)  At the ensuing sentencing hearing, defense counsel 
noted that, despite prior rehabilitative efforts, Mr. Gleese had been unable to identify the 
root cause of his issues.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.9, L.15 - p.10, L.10.)  However, in preparation for 
this sentencing hearing, Mr. Gleese participated in a mental health evaluation, during 
which, he was diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder.  (Presentence Investigation 
Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.46.)  As a result, “It is highly recommended that client 
participate in substance abuse treatment, mental health services, and follow the 
requirements of felony probation.   In order to reduce the risk of recidivism, client will 
have a better outcome if he begins these services as soon as possible to start reducing 
symptomology and reduce his risk for a relapse.”  (PSI, p.47.) 
 Defense counsel added that this new diagnosis gave insight into Mr. Gleese’s 
substance abuse issues as well, as his use of methamphetamine could be properly 
addressed as an effort to self-medicate his symptoms of depression.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.10, 
Ls.12-15.)  Defense counsel also argued that simply executing a sentence would only 
                                            
1 The transcripts in this case are provided in three independently bound and paginated 
volumes.  To avoid confusion, the volume containing the transcript of the change of plea 
hearing held on March 4, 2016, will be referred to as “Vol.1.”  The volume containing the 
transcript of the sentencing hearing held on May 27, 2016, will be referred to as “Vol.2,” 
and the volume containing the transcript of the Rule 35 hearing held on July 1, 2016, 
will be referred to as “Vol.3.”  
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perpetuate the cycle Mr. Gleese was already in.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.10, L.22 - p.11, L.1.)  
Therefore, defense counsel recommended the district court impose a rehabilitation-
focused sentence, either by suspending the sentence for a period of probation, or 
alternatively, by retaining jurisdiction.2  (Tr., Vol.2, p.11, Ls.1-10.)   
 The district court acknowledged Mr. Gleese’s mental health issues and 
expressed a desire to see him rehabilitate.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.13, Ls.9-19, p.15, Ls.12-23.)  
However, it also acknowledged Mr. Gleese criminal history, and pointed out that he had 
only been on parole a few months before he was back into his same habits.3  (Tr., Vol.2, 
p.13, Ls.6-8, 19-25.)  As such, the district court imposed and executed a unified 
sentence of five years, with two years fixed.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.16, Ls.12-13; R., pp.49-50.)  
The district court explained it hoped the sentence would promote Mr. Gleese’s 
rehabilitation by providing a long period of forced sobriety.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.16, Ls.15-16.) 
 Mr. Gleese subsequently filed a timely Rule 35 motion.  (R., p.52.)  At a hearing 
on that motion, he explained he had been evaluated for a treatment program in prison, 
but had not yet begun receiving that treatment.  (Tr., Vol.3, p.7, Ls.1-8.)  He also 
explained that, if paroled, he would be able to live with his girlfriend and he had an 
employment opportunity available to him.  (Tr., Vol.3, p.7, L.19 - p.8, L.7.)  Therefore, he 
requested the district court modify his sentence to a unified term of five years, with only 
one year fixed, so as to provide the opportunity to get treatment in a timelier manner.  
                                            
2 Defense counsel acknowledged that Mr. Gleese had previously participated in two 
rider programs, but explained neither program had the benefit of Mr. Gleese’s mental 
health diagnosis in crafting a treatment plan.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.11, Ls.11-12.) 
3 The Department of Correction’s website indicates Mr. Gleese’s parole has also been 
revoked.  (See also Tr., Vol.2, p.8, Ls.4-6 (the prosecutor anticipating a parole violation 
would follow the resolution of the instant case).)  However, the cases in which 
Mr. Gleese was on parole are not on appeal here. 
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(Tr., Vol.3, p.7, Ls.9-11, p.8, L.21.)  The district court denied that motion, explaining it 
felt the sentence as imposed was still appropriate and believed Mr. Gleese would be 
getting treatment “sooner than you think.”  (Tr., Vol.3, p.11, Ls.3-11; R., p.73.) 
 Mr. Gleese filed a notice of appeal timely from the Judgment of Conviction.  
(R., pp.49, 60.) 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it imposed and executed 
Mr. Gleese’s sentence. 
 






The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed And Executed Mr. Gleese’s 
Sentence 
 
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively 
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, 
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest.  See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 
(Ct. App. 1982).  In order to show an abuse of discretion in the district court’s 
sentencing decision, the defendant must show, in light of the governing criteria, the 
sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts.  State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 
293, 294 (1997).  The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, are:  (1) protection of 
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.  Id.  The protection of 
society is the primary objective the court should consider.  State v. Charboneau, 124 
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Idaho 497, 500 (1993).  However, the Idaho Supreme Court has also held that 
rehabilitation “should usually be the initial consideration in the imposition of the criminal 
sanction.”  State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded on other grounds as 
stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015). 
In this case, while the district court acknowledged a desire to see Mr. Gleese 
rehabilitate, it imposed a sentence which did not most effectively serve that goal.  As a 
result, it imposed a sentence which also failed to effectively serve the primary objective 
of protection of society.  The mental health evaluator’s treatment recommendation 
summarizes the interplay of these two goals, as well as the best means to achieve 
them, in Mr. Gleese’s case:  “It is highly recommended that client participate in 
substance abuse treatment, mental health services, and follow the requirements of 
felony probation.   In order to reduce the risk of recidivism, client will have a better 
outcome if he begins these services as soon as possible to start reducing 
symptomology and reduce his risk for a relapse.”  (PSI, p.47.)  In addition to explaining 
why a sentence aimed at getting Mr. Gleese into rehabilitative programs which would 
provide the opportunity to address the root of Mr. Gleese’s issues should have been 
imposed in this case, that recommendation also demonstrates why Mr. Gleese’s 
previous opportunities for rehabilitation had not been successful – they had not taken a 
mental health diagnosis into account. (See Tr., Vol.2, p.11, Ls.11-12) 
Furthermore, defense counsel explained Mr. Gleese’s participation in the mental 
health evaluation “has really been an eye opening experience for him,” which has made 
him, according to the mental health evaluator, “very motivated and ready for treatment.”  
(Tr., Vol.2, p.9, Ls.21-25; PSI, p.45.)  Additionally, Mr. Gleese’s parents remain 
6 
supportive and were hopeful that, with the information from the mental health 
evaluation, they could help him address the root of his issues.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.9, 
Ls.14-18.)  Mr. Gleese’s amenability to treatment, with the more complete 
understanding of his situation and continuing familial support, corroborates the 
prudence of the mental health evaluator’s recommendation:  provide him timely access 
to rehabilitation programs because he is more likely to successfully rehabilitate in that 
scenario.   
Finally, as the mental health evaluator noted (PSI, p.47), providing timely access 
to rehabilitative programs will not only improve the chances for successful rehabilitation, 
but also will provide more protection to society in the long term because it would reduce 
the risk of a relapse.  See, e.g., State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982) (recognizing the 
timing of rehabilitative programming is an important consideration at sentencing); 
Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008) (same).  While the district court’s 
desire to provide rehabilitation through a period of forced sobriety is notable, it does not 
provide for timely access into rehabilitative programs.  As such, it is not the most 
effective option to address the goals of sentencing vis-à-vis Mr. Gleese’s particular 
needs.  That means the district court’s decision to execute Mr. Gleese’s sentence, 
rather than suspend it or retain jurisdiction, both of which would allow Mr. Gleese 
access to the necessary rehabilitative programs as soon as possible, constituted an 







The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Gleese’s Rule 35 Motion 
 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence pursuant to Rule 35 is addressed 
to the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and is essentially a plea for leniency 
which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.  
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).  When petitioning for a sentence 
reduction pursuant to Rule 35, the defendant must show his sentence is excessive in 
light of new or additional information presented to the sentencing court.  Id.  “The criteria 
for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in 
determining whether the original sentence was reasonable.”  State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 
251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994).   
At the Rule 35 hearing, Mr. Gleese presented new information about the housing 
and employment opportunities available to him if he were parole-eligible.  He also 
presented additional information about the treatment program he expected he would 
complete prior to release on parole.  Compare State v. Martinez, 154 Idaho 940, 949 
(Ct. App. 2013) (“The judge may consider . . . any new information concerning the 
defendant's rehabilitative progress in confinement” pursuant to a Rule 35 motion).  The 
district court’s acknowledgement that Mr. Gleese should be getting that treatment 
“sooner than you think” (Tr., Vol.3, p.11, Ls.3-11) actually demonstrates it had not 
sufficiently considered the information provided by the mental health evaluator – that 
Mr. Gleese should get that treatment “as soon as possible” to better prevent a relapse 
down the line.  (PSI, p.47.)  The hope that Mr. Gleese might get treatment soon does 
not, as discussed in Section I, supra, provide the soonest possible access to treatment 
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programs.  Therefore, for reasons discussed in Section I, supra, the district court 
abused its discretion by not reducing Mr. Gleese’s sentence, such that he would be 
immediately parole-eligible and be able to enter that treatment program as soon as 
possible.   
CONCLUSION 
 
Mr. Gleese respectfully requests that this Court remand this case to the district 
court for a new sentencing determination.  Alternatively, he requests that this Court 
reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
 DATED this 21st day of November, 2016. 
 
      ____/S/_____________________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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